The future of Syria: Implications for global and regional powers

TEHRAN – As Donald Trump will take power in the White House on January 20, the strategic regions of the world are now being trapped in a situation known as “tactical wars”. These conflicts do not seek a definitive victory but rather aim to create a state of instability and uncertainty in key areas vital to U.S. global interests.

The “America First” slogan, central to Trump’s agenda, can only materialize if Washington succeeds in maintaining its hegemony over the major geostrategic regions. However, this dominance is only possible if one essential factor is guaranteed: an active and sustained military presence in these regions.

In these sensitive territories, the United States faces growing resistance from both local governments and popular movements demanding the withdrawal of American troops. If Washington were to yield to these demands and abandon Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, or the Persian Gulf; renounce its intervention in Ukraine and the Caucasus under the pretext of NATO; or reduce its activities in the South China Sea, it would risk becoming just another power, unable to maintain its global hegemony.

The United States deems it necessary to maintain its presence in these strategic regions to avoid the decline of hegemony. Its military deployments, although costly and often unpopular, are seen as the only means to ensure its position as a dominant power in an increasingly competitive world.

As explained by Iranian diplomat Mohammad Rasoul Mousavi, the strategy to preserve the United States’ military presence is based on fueling what are known as “tactical wars.” These wars do not seek a definitive resolution but rather aim to prolong the conflict. On one hand, they weaken the countries involved, and on the other, allow the United States to justify and impose its presence in those regions.

Mousavi interprets the resurgence of the conflict in Syria as a clear manifestation of the United States’ strategic approach. In the current context, it is evident how Washington is attempting to consolidate its presence in the region. Despite avoiding responsibility for the war led by extremist militants backed by Turkey, the United States insists that the solution to the conflict is inevitably tied to its military presence in Syria— a presence that would be difficult to justify without the conflict serving as a pretext.

Additionally, there is a clear contradiction in the United States’ stance. In the current offensive against the government of Bashar al-Assad, the main units fighting alongside anti-Assad forces are primarily affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This group, which separated from Al-Qaeda in 2016, has maintained a strong presence in Syria.

Since 2018, the U.S. State Department has designated HTS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. HTS remains a central player in the Syrian conflict, particularly in the regions of Aleppo and Hama. The group is led by Abu Muhammed al-Golani, who previously led the Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. In 2016, al-Golani announced HTS’s separation from Al-Qaeda, claiming a distance from the global terror network. However, his ties with Al-Qaeda remain a burden, continuously attracting international attention. For example, the U.S. still offers a $10 million reward for the capture of al-Golani, reflecting the ongoing mistrust toward the group and its ideology.

In general, Syria is a stage where various geopolitical interests converge. In the case of Turkey, the potential fall of Bashar al-Assad would have significant strategic implications. Through its allied groups in Syria, such as the self-styled Syrian National Army and HTS, Turkey could consolidate and significantly expand its power and influence in a territory that was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to 1918.

A withdrawal of Russia, its historical rival in the region, would represent a key political victory for Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while constituting a defeat for Vladimir Putin and weakening Russian influence in the Middle East. Additionally, the weakening or elimination of Kurdish forces in Syria, a constant point of friction for Ankara, would be one of Turkey’s primary strategic objectives.

Finally, once Syria was “pacified” by HTS and its allies, Erdogan could seize the opportunity to facilitate the return of the millions of Syrian refugees currently in Turkey, presenting Assad’s fall as the end of the war. This measure could potentially boost support for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in future elections.

The potential fall of Bashar al-Assad would have profound consequences for Russia, as it could redefine both its influence in Syria and its projection in the Middle East. The loss of its main ally in Damascus would signal the end of its political influence in the country, marking a strategic defeat that would alter the regional balance. Additionally, Russia would be surpassed by Turkey, which would solidify its power and influence in Syria, leading to a geopolitical reshaping in favor of Ankara.

Russia’s military presence, essential to its influence in Syria, could be significantly reduced or even eliminated, representing a substantial loss of power in the region. Moreover, Moscow would lose control of the naval base in Tartus, a strategic facility it has controlled since 1971 during the Soviet era and it serves as its only permanent military base in the Mediterranean. The loss of Tartus would deal a major blow to Russia’s ability to project power in the Middle East.

The potential fall of Bashar al-Assad would also bring a series of strategic implications for Israel, directly impacting its security in the region.

For Iran, the fall of Bashar al-Assad would have political and strategic consequences. First, Iran would lose a key ally in the region.

However, the rise of Turkey as a regional power would be a blow to Iran’s interests, as it would witness its rival expanding its power while Iran’s own political and military presence in Syria and Lebanon crumbles. This scenario would lead to the weakening of Shia interests in Syria, Lebanon, and even Iraq, disrupting the regional balance and undermining Iran’s influence in these key countries.

Finally, for the United States, the fall of Bashar al-Assad would have significant strategic implications. First, it would mean Russia’s withdrawal from Syria, which would considerably weaken Moscow’s influence in the region, reducing its projection of power in the Middle East.

Additionally, the United States would achieve a key victory by seeing the fall of Assad’s government, considered one of Iran’s main allies, with whom Washington maintains an openly adversarial relationship. This would mark the end of a long struggle to displace a government that has been an obstacle to U.S. policy in the region, consolidating the influence of Washington and its allies in Syria and the Levant.