The state of Iran-Egypt relations: past and present 

MADRID – The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, visited Cairo this week to participate in the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation Summit, also known as the “Developing 8.” 

The summit gathered leaders from Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey. This event marked the first visit by a senior Iranian official to Egypt in the past 11 years, a significant milestone in the relationship between the two countries.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, diplomatic relations between Tehran and Cairo have not been fully restored, despite numerous attempts at rapprochement. In this context, Iranian media have expressed optimism that Pezeshkian’s visit, leading a high-level delegation, could signal the start of a new phase in the relations between Iran and Egypt, two key players in the region’s political landscape.

Egypt and Iran severed diplomatic relations in 1979, though they were partially resumed 11 years later. However, the restoration of communication did not equate to a full return to diplomatic ties; interactions remained limited to business representatives and interest protection offices. From a political standpoint, relations between the two countries can be divided into two key phases: pre-Islamic revolution and post-1979.

The first phase of relations between Iran and Egypt corresponds to the pre-revolutionary period, when the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi aligned with the United States and Israel, recognizing the Zionist state in 1950. This pro-Western stance solidified Iran as a strategic ally of the United States in the region, generating friction with Arab nations, including those under Egypt’s leadership.

This period was also marked by the coup d’état of the “Free Officers” in Egypt, led by Naguib and Abdel Nasser, which overthrew the monarchy and established a republic oriented towards the East. This fundamental shift transformed bilateral relations, ushering in a phase of increasing tension. 

Egypt’s emphasis on pan-Arabism during the 1950s and 1960s played a crucial role in this deterioration. Pan-Arabism, a movement that promoted unity and cooperation among Arab countries, was perceived as a direct threat to the “reactionary axis” led by the Shah, who viewed this movement as a challenge to his alliance with the West and his geopolitical vision for the region.

Iran’s policy towards the Zionist regime, its promotion of confrontation between Arabs and Iranians, criticism of the regressive nature of the Iranian monarchy, and accusations that Tehran was merely a tool of the West were some of the primary points of friction between the two countries. In this regard, opposition to Iran’s growing influence in the region was a cornerstone of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s foreign policy. In 1950, following a strong speech against the government of Mohammad Reza Shah, Nasser ordered the severing of diplomatic relations with Iran in response to the Shah’s pact with the Zionist regime.

The death of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the rise to power of Anwar Sadat marked a crucial opportunity for improving relations between Iran and Egypt. In this new context, Egyptian President Sadat made a visit to Tehran on October 11, 1970, marking the beginning of a new phase of rapprochement. In 1974, following the visit of the Egyptian Prime Minister to Tehran, Iran granted Egypt a loan of one billion dollars for the expansion of the Suez Canal, the reconstruction of Port Said, and the construction of an oil pipeline from Suez to Port Said. This was one of the decisive steps in the reactivation of bilateral ties between the two countries.

Under the Pahlavi regime, Iran welcomed the 1975 Sinai Agreement and, later, the Camp David Accords signed by Sadat in 1978 between Egypt and Israel, viewing these agreements as an opportunity to consolidate its strategic position in the region. Iran’s support for these accords reflected its desire to strengthen its relationship with Egypt, especially at a time when regional dynamics were shifting and new alliances were being formed.

However, following the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, relations between Iran and Egypt were once again marked by tension. The shift of Iran’s stance on the Palestinian cause, the signing of the Camp David Treaty between Egypt and Israel, and the welcoming of the deposed Shah in Cairo were decisive factors that triggered a drastic change in bilateral relations. 

From the late 1970s, Egypt, under the leadership of Anwar el-Sadat, had shifted its national security strategy, moving away from its historic confrontation with Israel and adopting a policy more aligned with Western interests. However, the Islamic Revolution brought a completely different approach in Iran, which redirected its focus toward supporting the Palestinian cause and promoting Resistance movements across the region.

This clash of visions led to a rupture that extended beyond diplomacy. While Egypt sought to position itself as a key ally in the Western-led regional order, Iran emerged as an ideological and political challenge to the status quo. The incompatibility of their international agendas not only eliminated any possibility of collaboration but also positioned both nations as adversaries in an increasingly polarized regional landscape.

With the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, Egypt firmly aligned itself with Baghdad, offering unwavering support to Saddam Hussein’s regime. This backing was not only political but also manifested through the mobilization of Egyptian citizens, many of whom volunteered to join the Iraqi army in the invasion against Iran. This policy reflected Egypt’s alignment with traditional Arab interests and its intention to counter the growing Iranian influence in the region following the Islamic Revolution, which had shifted the power balance in West Asia.

However, by the late 1990s, the situation began to change. Under the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) in Iran, the implementation of a policy of détente opened a new chapter in bilateral relations. This approach was reciprocated by Egypt, marking a shift towards greater cooperation between the two countries.

The rapprochement between Egypt and Iran was reflected in the strengthening of economic ties, with mutual delegation visits and the signing of agreements to boost collaboration in strategic sectors. While historical and political differences did not completely disappear, this phase represented a joint effort to overcome past antagonisms and explore opportunities for mutual benefit.

Under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), Iran pursued an active foreign policy that prioritized the expansion of its political, cultural, and economic ties, particularly with Africa and strategic countries such as Egypt. Since coming to power in 2005, the Iranian government implemented initiatives such as the creation of the Africa Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the strengthening of cooperation with key ministries, such as the Ministry of Energy, to diversify its international alliances. This approach reflected Iran’s desire to solidify its influence amid the growing competition for regional clout.

Following the January 25, 2011, Revolution in Egypt, hopes arose for a potential rapprochement between Cairo and Tehran. The visit of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi to Tehran in August 2012, for a Non-Aligned Movement summit, marked a historic event, being the first time in over three decades that an Egyptian president visited Iran. In turn, in February 2013, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad traveled to Egypt to attend a summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, raising expectations about the possibility of normalizing relations.

However, despite these diplomatic gestures, the deep political and strategic differences between the two countries prevented significant progress in their bilateral relations. Historical factors and divergent regional alignments remained difficult obstacles to overcome, leaving relations between Iran and Egypt in a state of ambiguous cordiality, with no tangible progress toward genuine cooperation.

During Hassan Rouhani’s presidency (2013-2021), relations between Iran and Egypt took a backseat in Iran’s foreign policy agenda. While there were expectations that the Rouhani administration might give new momentum to bilateral ties, Tehran’s regional and global priorities pushed Egypt to a secondary position.

With the arrival of Ebrahim Raisi in power in 2021, the dynamic began to shift. His government promoted meetings between Iranian and Egyptian ministers to explore the possibility of strengthening ties, an effort that was reinforced in May 2023, when the late Raisi instructed his Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take concrete steps to strengthen relations with Cairo.

The most significant advancement in Egypt-Iran relations occurred one year ago, when the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, culminating in the full restoration of their ties after years of tension, acted as a catalyst for improving discussions between Tehran and Cairo. This context led to several rounds of talks aimed at solidifying a stronger relationship between the two countries.

Iranian authorities, such as Mohammad Mokhber, then head of the executive branch, and Ali Bagheri Kani, the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, reaffirmed Tehran’s commitment to continue negotiations with Cairo. They also highlighted their determination to carry forward the process initiated by the late President Raisi and the late Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian.

On the Egyptian side, Sameh Shoukry, Egypt’s Foreign Minister until 2024, took advantage of his visit to Tehran to express condolences for the martyrdoms of Raisi and Amir-Abdollahian, while reiterating the importance of progressing with consultations. He emphasized the need to build relations on solid and stable foundations, leaving the door open to a new chapter in the bilateral ties between the two nations.

Both countries have recently shown political willingness to fully restore their diplomatic ties. In this regard, Iranian political vice president Mehdi Sanaei expressed hope that the embassies of Iran and Egypt would soon reopen. 

In a recent statement, Sanaei recalled that it has been over four decades since the two countries maintained formal diplomatic relations, but he highlighted that there has been more active interaction between them in the past year. “There is the necessary will on both sides to resume relations, and we hope that, with the steps that have been taken, we will reach the stage of reopening the embassies,” Sanaei told reporters.

This renewed rapprochement, although still in its early stages, reflects a significant shift in the regional dynamics, where both Egypt and Iran seem willing to overcome decades of estrangement.